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Abstract:  
We outline the determinants of local public policies for farmland preservation and urban 
expansion. We first rely on the literature and on a purposely-designed field study of 
municipalities in Southern France to propose a theoretical framework better suited to the 
French situation. The model considers aspects of land consumption, two interest groups as 
well as the median voter, and is then econometrically tested. We confirm the expected effects 
of certain socio-demographic determinants; highlight the impact of municipal budgetary 
considerations and the role of the agricultural sector. We also find more counter-intuitive 
determinants, like local political regime or unbalanced neighbouring relationships.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
Urban sprawl associated with diminishing agricultural land and its highly debated 
socio-economic and environmental impacts is a worldwide issue (UN Habitat 2010). 
Agricultural production needs to increase, in order to feed the world in the future (FAO 2009). 
However, arable lands are not infinitely expandable and some competitive uses – like biofuel 
production - are already decreasing foodstuffs production. Moreover, given the current public 
support for environmental preservation, farming practices need to become more wildlife-
friendly, with the consequent reduced productivity (Green et al. 2005). These trends explain 
the recent recommendations - at different institutional levels (for instance United Nations 
2010; or Central State level in France) – in favour of farmland preservation. However, these 
recommendations do not seem sufficient to alter the trend to urban sprawl: first, because 
contradictory regulations and incentives sometimes emerge from the various institutions that 
make these land-sparing recommendations (see for example CAS 2011); second, because 
policies directly related to land consumption, like land use policies, are mainly produced by 
more local jurisdictions acting under a variety of rationales to counter or to favour sprawl. It is 
consequently crucial to outline the determinants of urban expansion policies in order to 
understand how local jurisdictions behave.  
While many studies have addressed the question of growth control, few consider 
policy in terms of potential land consumption impacts. Thus, Rolleston (1987) and Solé-Ollé 
and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) (SOVM in the following) consider the relative areas authorized 
for urban development; Schmidt and Paulsen (2009) analyze the determinants of the amount 
of land preserved per capita; Lewis and Neiman (2002), Rolleston (1987) and Pirotte and 
Madre (2011) take into account density aspects and Brody, Carrasco, and Highfield (2006) 
develop an anti-sprawl measure quality index. In other studies, the policies considered have 
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only an indirect and very ambiguous link to the land consumption issues previously identified 
by Pendall (1999), focusing instead on housing and demographic aspects. 
 Most of these studies deal with or are inspired by North American cases, in which both 
the geographic and institutional situation, and the commonly used regulatory tools differ from 
those of European, and particularly French, cases. Geographically, European cities have 
traditionally been much more compact than American cities, having developed a dense 
historical core shaped before the emergence of modern transport systems (Uhel 2006). They 
also usually have more mixed uses (Hirt 2012), dynamic urban centres and numerous small 
and medium surrounding towns (Catalán, Saurí, and Serra 2008). On the other hand, artificial 
land
i
 represents a greater share of the territory in Europe (8.8% - Eurostat 2011) than in the 
USA (2.6% - USDA 2002). Moreover, land consumption per capita (493 million inhabitants 
in 2006) is increasing, with an expanding individual housing market and increased economic 
infrastructures and road networks (European commission 2011). As a result, urban sprawl is 
common throughout Europe, especially around smaller towns or in the countryside, along 
transportation corridors and in many parts of the coast, usually where there are river valleys.  
 
 Institutionally, land development regulations play an important role (e.g., Nivola 
1999) and explain some differences from North America. The type of zoning that American 
planners and citizens are familiar with - separation of urban functions and predilection for 
single-family housing - is not so common in Europe (Hirt 2012). Indeed, the French type of 
planning, which has been influential throughout Europe, is inherited from Napoleon and 
characterized by a high level of codification and centralized governance: elected officials 
must set their land use regulation policies within the framework of national documents related 
to planning (Hirt 2012). In this form of planning, regulations can be very stringent with 
respect to building form (height, floor area ratios) but less so with respect to function, 
Ve
rs
io
n 
pr
ep
rin
t
Comment citer ce document :
Channel, O., Delattre, L., Napoleone, C. (2014). Determinants of local public policies for
farmland preservation and urban expansion: A french Illustration. Land Economics, 90 (3), 411–433.
  
6 
 
allowing mixed use in urban functions. Lastly, European taxation systems are generally based 
less on property values than on property revenues and added value, and central governments 
impact the design of taxation more powerfully by collecting and redistributing some local 
taxes to maintain equity among local jurisdictions. Thus, incentives to support activities that 
increase property values are lower in Europe than in the USA, because these activities will not 
strongly impact local finances (Jacobs 2008), and fiscal and monetary tools are therefore less 
used to control growth at municipal level. Overall, municipal land use regulations are the 
main tool used to control farmland conversion to urban use in France (Shone 2010; Fischel 
1987; Derycke and Gilbert 2008; Charlot and Paty 2007; Charlot, Paty, and Visalli 2011; 
Comby and Renard 1996; Alterman 1997). 
 
Because French municipal land use regulations are very different from North 
American ones, farmland preservation determinants are expected to differ. Consequently, by 
restricting the modelling only to determinants found relevant in the North American case, one 
might spuriously attribute to them the land use planning decisions observed in France and 
miss the actual drivers. However, there is currently no quantified validation of the 
determinants involved in decision-making related to land use policies in French jurisdictions, 
and the literature, particularly the quantitative literature, contains few studies of European 
cases, with the notable exception of SOVM (2012).  
 
In this article, we focus on South-Eastern France, a region that, like many other 
Northern Mediterranean regions, has experienced strong and Europe-specific trends to urban 
sprawl. We widen and enrich the model developed by SOVM (2012) that considers the choice 
of policy as a function of the median voter (referred to as representative voter in SOVM) and 
of interest group utility variations, taking into account the role of electoral competition. Thus, 
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we develop a theoretical framework compatible with the French historical, legal and 
jurisdictional context. It introduces density restriction considerations, considers the role of a 
pro-agriculture interest group and allows for an accurate characterization of the median voter, 
while considering geographical factors (including neighbouring relationship effects) and 
political factors, like local government’s legitimacy, the consequences of supra-municipal 
zoning and of past municipal policies. 
After describing the French institutional framework and reviewing the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature (Section II), we set an original theoretical framework for 
local land use policy decision-making, derived from an extensive field survey (Section III). 
We then propose an appropriate econometric strategy and create a rich database on land uses, 
demographic and political characteristics at municipality level (Section IV). This database is 
used to empirically validate our model, while accounting for possible selection bias, and for 
the purposes of comparison with SOVM’s model (Section V). We discuss the main results 
and conclude in Section VI. 
 
II INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The French legal and institutional framework for land use plans 
 
In France, the municipality is the smallest jurisdiction. There are 36,680 municipalities 
(vs. only 330 in the UK, for instance). The majority of municipalities are small: the average 
population of French municipalities (1,700 inhabitants) is lower than the average in the 
European Union (4,000 inhabitants) (INSEE 2009). French municipalities have to respect 
common patterns when creating or altering a land use policy. Given this common framework, 
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the tools and policy levels used are far less diverse than in other countries, like the United 
States for instance (Schone 2010); the main tool for land use policies is the local land use 
plan.  
Municipal councils draw up land use plans at municipal level. When a council 
proposes a new land use plan, it is generally drawn up with the technical support of private or 
public planning offices and takes into account the recommendations of several public 
organizations (board of trade, board of agriculture, government agencies, etc.). Then, the plan 
is subjected to government checks on compliance with law and to several public inquiries 
(from citizens and public/private organizations). Some non-land-use-specific central 
government regulations can impact land use: national policies on environment, housing, 
economic activities, transport and natural/technology risk and environmental zoning (with 
varying levels of restrictiveness). However, the central government also designs a land-use-
specific framework that each municipality must respect when creating or altering land use 
plans. After the necessary amendments, the municipal council adopts the plan. Although land-
use plans are only compulsory under specific conditions (of municipal population and of 
attachment to certain urban areas), most municipalities have one, except for very small rural 
municipalities.  
A land use plan is constituted by a presentation of the municipal context, objectives 
and rationales, a map with the different zones and regulations detailing the rules for each type 
of zone. Regulatory tools such as “special permits”, “planned unit development”, “contract 
zoning” or “linkages” and transferable development rights are either rare or forbidden, as are 
criteria explicitly selecting inhabitants, like single-family zoning. Neither “growth caps”, 
“population caps”, “Ballot-box growth controls” nor protective covenants exist in France. The 
main types of zone are the “urban zone”, covering the built-up and developable areas; the 
“future urbanization zone”, developable in the middle or long term; the “agricultural zone”, 
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non-developable except for agricultural-activity-related buildings; and the “natural zone”, 
non-developable (Schone 2010). In these plans, specific developable zones can be used to 
create a diffuse urban fabric where a minimum area is required to build a house. There are 
many of these diffuse urban fabric zones and they create significant urban growth. Thus, 
current central government policy limits urban expansion and favours urban renewal 
(DGUHC 2003), but although municipalities are subject to a common framework, they 
actually have substantial leeway to make decisions. Lastly, when a once-developable parcel is 
zoned as non-developable there is no compensation for any decline in property values, 
whereas the reverse situation is highly profitable to owners and developers since it involves 
very little extra outlay (Alterman 1997; Comby and Renard 1996). 
 
The French situation: lessons from the literature 
 
Existing quantitative models applied to studies based on French cases deal with the 
probability of adoption of a land use plan (Lecat 2006) without mentioning their guidelines, or 
with local tax choices (Schone 2010), while Pirotte and Madre (2011) explain the degree of 
dispersion of the three main French Metropolitan areas by the relative population growth of 
their constitutive municipalities in relation to their distance from the CBD. Further examples 
are Geniaux, Ay, and Napoléone (2011), who rely on development optimal timing literature 
on the one hand, and on econometrics modelling applied to Southern France on the other 
hand. They show that landowner anticipation of agricultural land use conversion is one of the 
key drivers of future development, especially when land use plans are frequently altered or 
perceived as subject to change.  
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 In addition, the literature contains several qualitative studies on French cases such as 
Charmes (2007, 2009), Vilmin (2002) and Castel (2007). According to these studies, the 
population of a municipality first grows because encouraging new inhabitants is seen as a way 
to revitalize the municipality and as a windfall for landowners, who are often influential in 
municipal councils. This more or less continuous growth phase leads to a socio-demographic, 
political and budgetary balance upheaval before the municipality reaches a demographic 
stabilization phase. This new phase is accompanied by the political will to maintain living 
conditions to the detriment of urban development and land value gains. Consequently, a 
development spillover to more remote municipalities occurs, so that a “municipal green belt” 
is maintained to a greater or lesser degree around each municipality (Charmes 2009). The 
final stage may be a modest growth phase linked to persistent demand for growth from 
landowners, which may be supported by collective constraints (to maintain local schools, to 
support the local business or services centre, etc.).  
 This “leapfrog development” phenomenon is, of course, not France-specific but is 
reinforced in the French case by the high degree of control over land use decisions given to 
each municipality, allowing them a lot of room for manoeuvre despite a common legal 
framework. Moreover, the majority of French municipalities have small populations (15% of 
the population live in 75% of the municipalities that have less than 1,000 inhabitants), leading 
to a close relationship between elected representatives and residents, which ensures that 
landowners’ and homeowners’ preferences are taken into account (Charmes 2007; Castel 
2007). All this can result in “residential environment markets”: each municipality offers its 
own residential environment basket and households “foot-vote” according to the proposed 
baskets rather than according fiscal considerations (Charmes 2007). Additional factors are 
that primary schools are still mainly financed by the central state, and that local taxes appear 
to have less effect on choice of household location than on choice of business location 
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(Derycke and Gilbert 2008; Charlot and Paty 2007; Charlot, Paty, and Visalli 2011). This 
sequence of events is observed in the outlying areas of every municipality sooner or later, 
depending on their distance from the core of the urban area, leading to what Castel (2007) 
calls a “émiettement urbain” (closest French equivalent to “leapfrog development”). In this 
view, preferences for open-space-related amenities and uncertainty on future profitability of 
urban development (as compared to the profitability of different kinds of agricultural uses) 
play an important role, theoretically formalized by Cavailhès et al. (2004) who did not, 
however, really consider the policies involved. The result of this process is that discontinuous 
urbanization rings are formed  
 
The Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) model as a starting point 
 
We rely on the SOVM (2012) model as a starting point for several reasons: it deals 
with the amount of land that became developable (measured in percentage of the already 
urbanized area) over a given period under municipal plans, as is common in France; it is 
applied to a Southern European area (Spain), like our own area of study; and the theoretical 
framework used combines most of the advances made in previous work. The amount of land 
becoming developable depends on a trade-off made by the elected mayor between increasing 
land rent and his/her expected utility of being re-elected. The land rent is a function of 
developers’ (and land-owners’) profit which increases with the amount of land devoted to 
urban development, especially when building demand is high and developable land supply is 
low at the time of decision. The probability of being re-elected depends on the median voter’s 
utility variation, which in turn depends on the variation in the amount of land devoted to 
urban development and a set of preference shifters that measures the marginal disamenity 
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effects of new development. The municipal government chooses the amount of land devoted 
to urban development so as to equalize the value of additional rents and the loss in utility 
derived from not being re-elected. According to this model, the weight on voter's welfare rises 
with the degree of political competition.  
 
III ENRICHING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK WITH A SPECIFIC FIELD 
STUDY 
A France-specific field study 
 
Our study area is the South-Eastern French region (Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur - PACA), 
with 3.18 million hectares and 5 million inhabitants spread over 963 municipalities. The 
population and related urbanization is essentially located on the Mediterranean coast and in 
the Rhône Valley (see Figure 1), while other areas are plateaus and mountains. This area is 
part of Southern Europe, whose dense and compact cities with centres showing no sign of 
decline differ markedly from those of North America. In this region, urban sprawl has been 
developing at unprecedented rates since the 1980’s (Uhel 2006) due to demographic growth 
along the coast, jobs based on new technologies (Dura-Guimera 2003) and tourism, which 
generates second-home urban development pressure. Being located in PACA ourselves 
enabled us both to collect and to access detailed databases, comparing them with a regional 
field survey.  
Following expert advice from SAFER, we chose a sample of 39 municipalities 
representing the diversity of situations that can be encountered in the region (see Figure 2). 
Semi-directive interviews were conducted in each municipality with the elected official in 
charge of urban planning or, by default, with the technical officer in charge of urban planning. 
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These interviews were aimed at revealing specific local drivers or individual willingness to 
change land use plans. Our survey covered: first, the adoption, date of change or state of 
progress of the ongoing plan; second, the main objectives and priorities leading to adoption or 
change of the plan; third, the tools used in the plan (zoning types, zone rules); fourth, the main 
difficulties encountered in drawing up, amending or enforcing the plan or, conversely, the 
facilitating factors; and last, the relationships with neighbouring municipalities, higher 
jurisdictional levels and related public organizations on these issues. The recorded interviews 
were then studied using an analytical grid so as to classify municipal strategies depending on 
their willingness to expand developable area on the one hand and their willingness to densify 
on the other hand. Then, we outlined the contexts, objectives and rationales that led 
municipalities to adopt each type of strategy. From this field analysis, detailed in Delattre, 
Chanel, and Napoléone (2012), we obtained four main results, used to enrich the theoretical 
framework.  
 
[FIGURE 1] 
[FIGURE 2] 
The enriched model 
We consider the choice made by the incumbent
ii
 at date t, concerning changes in land 
use policy in the next period (t, t+1): the decision not only on whether to increase the amount 
of developable land, but also by how much (ΔUrbanland(t,t+1)). We assume that this choice 
depends on the expected variations at date t implied in the dominant groups’ utility 
(Et[ΔUdom (t,t+1)]) and in the median voter’s utility (Et[ΔUmed(t,t+1)], the voters are the 
municipality’s current residents). Although the current dominant groups do not represent the 
majority of voters, they can offer political support to the incumbent, especially for re-election.  
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First, the field survey leads to better and more accurate characterizations of the 
dominant groups and the median voter. While the interest group in SOVM (2012) is 
composed of developers and landowners who only have an interest in urban development, we 
assume here that the utility of the “dominant interest group” does not depend only on land 
rent maximization. Interest groups in favour of urban land rent maximization can be very 
strong, but farmers’ groups too, although often made up of landowners, may be interested in 
farmland preservation. These kinds of interest group are, of course, present in municipalities 
where agricultural activity is very profitable (for example, world-famous vineyards), but not 
exclusively. Farmers in municipalities where urban land rent seems far higher than 
agricultural land rent may also support farmer-owned farmland preservation (in South-Eastern 
France, farmers own most of the parcels they cultivate). As observed during the field study, 
the decision of a farmer with landholdings to put pressure on the municipal council to obtain 
developable status for his parcels will not depend only on a comparison of the anticipated 
profits from agricultural activities with those from development (as usually presented for 
development timing). It will also depend on other local factors: “image” (organic farming, for 
example) and structure (local farmers’ organizations), the probability of a child taking over 
the farm, the relative profitability of the holding compared to holdings’ profitability in the 
same area/agricultural sector and its evolution over time. These aspects are rarely explicitly 
considered in land use policy modelling. Formally, we assume that the dominant groups’ 
utility is composed of the “pro-agriculture” group (indexed by da) and the pro-
development group (indexed by du). 
In addition, we assume that the median voter’s utility variation can also be 
decomposed into several aspects. Indeed, according to the literature and to statements by 
elected officials, the median voter can simultaneously be seen as a resident, homeowner or 
renter, (indexed by r), a taxpayer and local public service user (indexed by f), an amenity 
Ve
rs
io
n 
pr
ep
rin
t
Comment citer ce document :
Channel, O., Delattre, L., Napoleone, C. (2014). Determinants of local public policies for
farmland preservation and urban expansion: A french Illustration. Land Economics, 90 (3), 411–433.
  
15 
 
“consumer” (indexed by e), an adult of working age, working in the municipality or not 
(indexed by τ). 
Second, the balance between the induced variations in the median voter’s and 
dominant groups’ utility depends, if divergent, on electoral competition. SOVM (2012) show 
that a weak degree of electoral competition allows the elected officials to give the preferences 
of interest groups more consideration. Our field study brought to light more “audacious” 
political behaviour (in favour either of urban expansion or of densification, according to 
interest group) where electoral competition was weak. We assume that the incumbent assesses 
the level of electoral competition through the expected vote margin (Et(mt+1)) at the next 
municipal election. Because political studies on French municipalities show that the level of 
electoral competition is a relatively stable characteristic of municipalities over time, or at least 
that there is a positive significant relationship between electoral scores at successive 
municipal elections (Bages 2004; Nevers 1992; Jerôme-Speziari and Jérôme 2002), we 
assume that Et(mt+1) = mt . 
Third, what happens in neighbouring municipalities will affect the median voter’s, the 
interest groups’ and the elected officials’ perceptions of policy changes. Thus, if the 
surrounding municipalities have experienced changes that would have been beneficial to them 
if realized in their own municipality, the municipality will tend to adopt the same behaviour 
as its neighbours (mimicry). If neighbouring municipalities have experienced changes that 
would have been detrimental if realized in their own municipality, the municipality will tend 
to adopt different behaviour from that of its neighbours (differentiation). Lastly, if these 
neighbouring municipalities have experienced changes that have actual or potential spillover 
effects on the median voter’s municipality, the municipal government will adjust the policy in 
order to benefit or to protect the municipality from these effects. A change in a neighbouring 
municipality is even more likely to induce changes in a given municipality’s characteristics or 
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policy if they are close, especially (and perhaps only), as the field study indicates, if the 
neighbouring population is the same or larger. The set of characteristics taken into account 
with respect to neighbouring municipalities is denoted by v. 
Finally, other factors also need to be taken into account, like political ones: for 
instance, the number of years since the last land use policy change, the development 
opportunities still open under the current land use plan, the perception of past municipal 
experience (remaining vacant diffuse urban fabric zones, past housing development, etc.) in 
terms of desirable or undesirable consequences of land use regulation or contention over land 
use, the political leanings of the current elected officials. Political leanings appear to have 
more effect on choices related to density than on those related to expansion of developable 
area (even though the two aspects are linked if we consider population objectives). Avoidance 
of new pressure often explains the absence of major changes in land use policy, especially in 
municipalities where the stakes are high and/or where the issues traditionally cause friction. 
So it is important to take into account the “climate” in which elected officials evolve beyond 
their vote margin. Also worth considering are special local features, like a diffuse existing 
urban fabric (which can make coherent land use projects very cumbersome to implement 
alongside low density amenity conservation), regional demand for development (proximity of 
existing infrastructures and urban poles) or supra-municipal regulations that make some areas 
permanently non-developable. In fact, the interviewees frequently referred to these features. 
All these political dimensions are denoted by p.  
 
IV ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY AND DATA 
Econometric strategy 
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We first consider that, for a given period (t, t+1), the decisions on whether to make a 
change and by how much are made simultaneously. The dependent variable ΔUrbanlandi is 
higher than zero if municipality i increased its amount of developable area, and is zero 
otherwise. Consequently we opt for a Tobit model (Tobin 1958), left-censored in 0:   
ΔUrbanlandi* = Zi + ei with ei ~ N[0, 
2
e], i = 1, .., N      1  
 
with ΔUrbanlandi* a latent variable; Zi , a set of explanatory variables and ei an error term.  
 
We observe:  
ΔUrbanlandi = ΔUrbanlandi * if ΔUrbanlandi *>0 
ΔUrbanlandi = 0 otherwise 
 
where ΔUrbanlandi is the change in the amount of developable land of municipality i between 
t and t+1. 
 
 The maximum likelihood estimators of this model have the required statistical 
properties, but the model imposes by construction that the same set of variables Zi explains 
both the decision to increase and the extent of the increase. 
 
 We then relax this constraint by approaching the modelling of the political choice as a 
two-stage model. First, the decision to increase the amount of developable land when altering 
the plan can be modelled as (selection equation):  
 
Increasei* = Wi + ui   with ui ~ N[0, 
2
u]        2  
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where Increasei* is an unobserved latent variable, Wi is the set of variables explaining the 
decision to increase the amount of developable land and ui is the error term. We observe the 
Increasei variable such that:  
Increasei = 1 if Increasei* > 0 
Increasei = 0 if Increasei*  0 
where Increase=1 if municipality increased its developable area between t and t+1. 
 
Then, for municipalities showing a strictly positive increase in their amount of developable 
land, this increase can be modelled as (outcome equation): 
 
ΔUrbanlandi = Xi + I         3  
 
where Xi is the set of variables explaining the degree of change and i is the error term. 
However, the pair (ΔUrbanlandi, Xi) is only observed if Increasei = 1, and we need to 
take into account the fact that municipalities with increased developable land may not be 
randomly drawn from the overall sample. In other words, when computing the extent of the 
increase, we should account for the probability of an increase actually occurring, hence the 
value of a selection model whose guiding principle is the correlation between variables 
involved in the selection mechanism and unobserved individuals’ heterogeneity. Ignoring this 
selection would lead to biased estimators
iii
. We prefer Heckman (1976)’s two-step estimation 
method, more robust to misspecification and showing fewer convergence difficulties than the 
one-step (full information) maximum likelihood estimation method, which is more efficient 
when the error terms’ joint distribution actually follows a bivariate normal distribution. It 
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consists in estimating equation 2  on the total sample with a binomial Probit model and then 
calculating the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) using the estimated coefficients: 
 
iRMI ˆ =φ ˆ Wi ˆ Wi)         4  
where φ is the density function of the standard normal distribution and  is its cumulative 
distribution function. 
In the second step, the following equation is estimated only for municipalities showing 
a strictly positive increase in their amount of developable land: 
 
ΔUrbanlandi = Xi + ε + νi             5  
 with  νi=εi- ε iRMI ˆ ~N[0,
2
ε(1-
2
( iRMI ˆ  ( iRMI ˆ + ˆ W)))] where 
2
ε is the variance of i ; is 
the covariance between i  and ui;  is their linear correlation coefficient. 
 If ρ significantly differs from 0, the relevant model is the Heckman Selection model, 
otherwise, it is the Two-part Model (Madden 2008). The latter can be estimated with a Probit 
model for the first equation and an independent OLS model for the second equation.  
 
Data  
 
The amount of land rendered developable by law between 1999 and 2006 (according 
to the digital land use plan maps) as a percentage of the 1999 built-up area
iv
 (ΔUrbanland) is 
used as dependent variable, in line with SOVM (2012). As the law on development in the 
agricultural zone is very restrictive and well enforced even when related to agricultural 
activities, we consider the agricultural zone as a non-developable zone. Unfortunately, the 
i
RMI s
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densities authorized in the different zones are not available, and using a proxy such as 
residential densities at time t would have been problematic: observed densities in t might be 
the consequence of former policies (t-k). Moreover, policy changes in t do not necessarily 
cause changes in density, especially rapid ones.  
 On the other hand, several types of data on municipalities’ characteristics, population 
or land uses in the study area are available (see Table 1): 
- Data on land use and urban fabric from an improved version of CORINE Land Cover 
database (OCCUPSOL 1999) and from the land registers for 2005 and 2010 from which we 
located buildings existing in 1999
 
(CADASTRE). 
- Land use policy data (zoning) for 1999 and 2006 covering roughly 400 
municipalities (Land Use Database = LUP DB). If the municipality made any change in the 
land use plan over this period (not necessarily inducing an increase in the amount of 
developable land), it is listed in the database of the National Directorate-General for 
Urbanism, Housing and Building (DGUHC).  
- Socio-demographic and accessibility data from the National Institute of Statistical 
and Economic Studies (INSEE) for 1990 and 1999. For variables describing a growth rate 
(except for population trends), we calculate the difference between the value in 1999 and in 
1990 as a percentage of the 1990 population to avoid zeros at the denominator
v
.  
- Data on agricultural holdings and types of agricultural activities for 2000 from the 
database of the Mutualité Sociale Agricole (agricultural social mutual fund) and from the 
bureau for statistics of the French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (AGRESTE). We use 
the median farm turnover (profits + salary) as a proxy of the profitability of agricultural 
activity in the municipality. However, as turnover strongly depends on type of farming (for 
instance, for the same level of profitability, turnover is generally lower in livestock farming 
than in market gardening), we consider the relative difference between the median agricultural 
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turnover of the municipality and the median turnover of municipalities where farms are 
mainly of the same type. Several studies show that under specific conditions, land use zoning 
“follows the market” (Wallace 1988; McMillen and McDonald 1989, 1991a,b; Thorson 
1994). We could consider land prices but choose not to, for two types of reasons. First, the 
quality of price data is poor and the number of recorded sales is not sufficient in many 
municipalities, especially for developable areas. Second, land prices and public choice on land 
use issues are determined by the same characteristics (Pogodzinski and Sass 1994), so that 
using these characteristics and prices jointly in the same model would likely result in 
increased endogeneity and/or collinearity issues. Hence, we prefer to consider characteristics 
that are likely to describe the profitability of urban development and agricultural activity. The 
percentage of change in the number of farmers is computed similarly to the percentage of 
change in data from INSEE (i.e. with the 1990 population as denominator), since some 
municipalities showing no farmers in 1990 had farmers in 2000. We also consider a dummy 
standing for at least one organic farmer in the municipality (Organic). 
- Municipal budgetary data for 2000 from the French Ministry of Finance.  
- Relief is taken from the National Topographic and Equipment Data Base 
(BDTopo®) and the state environmental and risk zonings from the Regional Department of 
the Environment, Planning and Housing (DREAL). 
- We use the Quetelet Network’s database on the 2001 municipal election results, the 
website of the Ministry of the Interior for the results of Parliamentary elections (the 2002 
legislative elections) and the National Department of Urbanism, Housing and Building 
(DGHUC)’s database for disputes on land use policy changes between 2004 and 2007. To 
capture “the political leanings” of the residents, we use the first-round legislative election 
results from the Interior Ministry rather than the results of the municipal election, because in 
most small municipalities, candidates do not show a political leaning. Because green and 
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centre parties were under-represented, we considered green parties as left-wing and centre 
parties as right-wing.  
To take into account neighbour effects, we compute two variables for each 
municipality: the population in neighbouring municipalities (PopNeighb) and how it changes 
( PopNeighb). In accordance with the field observations, only neighbouring municipalities 
larger than the municipality considered are included in the computations
vi
. This calculation 
takes into account all the municipalities of the study area (963 municipalities) and 
municipalities belonging to French administrative departments having a common border with 
the study area, in order to limit border effect issues. The only remaining possible border issue 
is therefore the Italian border, but the absence of big cities on the Italian side and the fact that 
the Alps act as a natural border make this unlikely.  
Lastly, in accordance with field observations, we consider a dummy Azur equal to 1 if 
the municipality is located on the Côte d’Azur, an area with more intensive tourism than the 
rest of the region.  
The explanatory variables all describe either the municipal situation in 1999 (or if not 
available, in 2000, 2001 or 2002, except for the variable Disputes for any land-use-policy- 
related disputes between 2004 and 2007) or the evolution of a characteristic during years 
before 1999 or 2000 (mainly between 1990 and 1999-2000). Thus, these characteristics and 
their evolution can be considered as potential determinants, but not as consequences, of both 
the decision to increase the amount of developable land and the extent of this increase, 
measured between 1999 and 2006. This decreases the likelihood of endogeneity issues.  
We are left with 327 municipalities after database cleaning. Table 1 presents the 
variables, their sources, and the specific aspects of the theoretical framework they are 
intended to test. 
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[TABLE 1] 
 
V RESULTS 
 
 The overall estimation methodology controls for collinearity, for outliers (using 
Cook’s distance and Bonferroni outlier tests), for spatial dependence, and estimates a 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. The best models are selected based on 
Akaike’s information criteria.  
 The results of the Tobit model are given in Table 2 along with the marginal effects. 
Although all the municipalities made at least one change in their land use plan between 1999 
and 2006, about 17.5% made no increase in their amount of developable land and are hence 
left-censored. No collinearity or spatial dependence issues are found (p-values greater than 
0.31), the test of joint nullity of the coefficients is rejected (p-value<0.0001) but the pseudo 
R
2
 is very low (0.034). We observe a significant positive effect of AvailableLand (but an 
unsignificant effect of VacantLand), PopNeighb, Disputes and Organic and a significant 
negative effect of BuiltUp, Income and VoteMargin. The results from the Tobit model are 
considered in a comparative way when presenting and discussing the results from the two-
stage model, in order to highlight similarities and differences. 
[TABLE 2] 
 Regarding the two-stage model, the Likelihood Ratio test of independence between 
the selection and the outcome equations does not reject independence (p-value= 0.442), so 
that a Two-Part model is estimated (see Tables 3 and 4). 
[TABLE 3] 
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 The Probit equation is satisfactory: the test of joint nullity of the coefficients is 
strongly rejected (p-value < 10
-5
), McFadden pseudo R² is 0.321, the proportion of correct 
predictions is 86% and the three spatial error autocorrelation tests show its absence (p-values 
greater than 0.90). Average marginal effects are computed as the average of individual 
marginal effects for every variable, taking account of the discrete nature of the variable when 
relevant. 
 First, it is interesting to note that although the population (Population) and the 
population change ( Pop) of the municipality do not have a significant effect (but are 
maintained as control variables), their counterparts for neighbouring municipalities 
(PopNeighb and PopNeighb) have significant positive effects. Thus, even more than 
municipal characteristics, the supra-municipal local context seems to impact the decision (as 
previously observed by Nguyen 2009). The larger these neighbouring municipalities are, and 
the closer to the municipality under consideration, the greater the effects. While the evolution 
of the municipal population does not have a significant effect, the evolution of the population 
under 14 ( Under14) has a negative one. In fact, a 10 percentage point increase in its 
population under 14 means a 13.2% decrease in the probability of a municipality’s increasing 
its amount of developable land. This may be related to school (and child-related services) 
overcrowding issues.  
Municipal Cashflow, which is generally used as an indicator of a healthy budgetary 
situation, has a negative effect. This suggests that increasing the amount of developable land 
is seen by municipalities, whether rightly or wrongly (see e.g. Castel 2007; Guengant 1992; 
Burchell et al., 1998, 2002; Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2003; Camagni, Gibelli, and Rigamonti 
2002), as a way to improve an unhealthy budgetary situation. Conversely, municipalities in a 
good fiscal position do not feel the need to offer more land for development, not requiring 
more revenue.  
Ve
rs
io
n 
pr
ep
rin
t
Comment citer ce document :
Channel, O., Delattre, L., Napoleone, C. (2014). Determinants of local public policies for
farmland preservation and urban expansion: A french Illustration. Land Economics, 90 (3), 411–433.
  
25 
 
As in the Tobit Model, income per unit of consumption (Income) has a negative effect 
that may represent the preference of higher-income people moving into the municipality for 
preserving openland amenities. According to the Probit estimation, a 1,000-Euro increase in 
income decreases the probability of increasing the amount of developable land by 2,4%. 
Looking at the political variables, a 10 percentage point increase in the score of 
municipal elected officials in the 2001 elections (VoteMargin) decreases by 2.6% the 
probability of increasing the amount of developable land, and this effect is also observed to be 
significant and negative in the Tobit model. When a municipal council decides to make a 
change in the land use plan, there is usually strong landowner pressure to make their parcels 
developable, this pressure sometimes being supported by residents for diverse reasons (e.g. to 
achieve property ownership or to allow adult children to live in the municipality). Thus, not 
increasing the amount of developable land (for instance, in order to comply with national 
recommendations) requires a “political courage” more likely to exist if the council has a 
strong majority. Moreover, the fact that a left-wing party obtained the highest score in the first 
round of the 2002 legislative election (Left) decreases by 15% the probability of increasing 
the amount of developable land. In France, while the social anchoring of right-wing parties 
persists (especially among the self-employed), the people who generally vote for left-wing 
parties do not all belong to the working class traditionally motivated by social progress and 
“materialistic” values (purchasing power, wages, equity); left-wing voters also include upper-
class/graduates more recently motivated by “post-materialistic” values such as ecology or 
cultural liberalism. Left-wing voters are also usually younger than right-wing voters (Michelat 
and Tiberj 2007). It can therefore be assumed that left-wing voters are more likely to be in 
favour of affordable and/or smaller, denser housing, which may have an indirect effect on the 
decision to increase the amount of developable land, particularly if these voters share an 
ecological preference for non-built-up land and amenity preservation. 
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We observe a negative effect of farms’ relative turnover (Turnover) but a positive 
effect of the proportion of farmers in the population (Farmers). A 10-percentage point 
increase in the proportion of farmers means a 24% increase in the probability of a 
municipality’s increasing its amount of developable land. This suggests that when farms are 
more profitable than the median profitability of the sector, an increase is less likely; but the 
proportion of farmers appears to be a proxy for the proportion of landowners and for the 
weight of their interests. However, changes in the percentage of farmers never had a 
significant effect.  
Finally, the dummy Azur has a strongly significant negative effect: municipalities 
located on the Côte d’Azur are 26% less likely to increase their amount of developable land 
than municipalities located elsewhere in the PACA region. Indeed, municipalities located on 
the Côte d’Azur are generally very space-constrained because of their high proportion of 
urbanized land, specific regulations and strongly-sloping land, suggesting that increase is less 
likely when potential developable land is scarce. Besides, the strong pressure for development 
they face because of their location may make them reluctant to undertake any major land use 
change that would exacerbate these pressures. 
 
We now turn to the determinants of the amount of developable land for municipalities 
showing a strictly positive increase.  
[Table 4] 
The outcome equation does not show spatial-dependence problems (p-values>0.67) 
and has an adjusted R² of 0.29, which is acceptable given the small size of the sample and the 
fact that the dependent variable is expressed as a percentage. To limit non-linearity issues, we 
carry out a Box-Cox power transformation of the endogenous variables (Box and Cox, 1964).  
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 As in the Tobit model, the municipality’s population (Population) and larger 
neighbouring municipalities’ populations (PopNeighb) do not have significant effects, but are 
kept in the model as control variables. Population change in larger neighbouring 
municipalities ( PopNeighb) has a positive significant effect, while the municipality’s 
population growth ( Pop) has a significant negative effect: municipalities tend to “adapt” to 
their larger neighbours’ recent population growth by rendering land developable, but this 
increase in developable land is smaller in municipalities that have themselves just experienced 
population growth: in this case, new urban development is probably deflected to smaller and 
more peripheral areas that have experienced lower population growth in former years. This 
finding agrees with qualitative French studies previously mentioned. Along the same lines, 
the proportion of urbanized land (BuiltUp) has a significant and negative effect, as in the 
Tobit model, suggesting that municipalities reject further growth when they reach a given size 
or urbanization threshold. This variable was also negative but not significantly in the Probit 
model (p-value =0.381), which underlines the advantage of different set of explanatory 
variables when modeling the decision to increase and the extent of the increase. As expected, 
VacantH, the change in the share of vacant housing units, also has a significant negative 
effect. 
Regarding residents’ characteristics, UpperClass and Over75 have a significant 
negative effect. The percentage of upper class residents is a proxy for a high-income, graduate 
population. So a high proportion of wealthier, more educated residents does not lead to large 
increases in developable land, probably for reasons of rural amenity preservation. A high 
percentage of over-75s has the same effect, but in this case due to elderly households’ 
preference for smaller, more centrally-located housing units. These varying rationales for low 
increases consequently have different implications for housing supply and density. Finally, 
one “standard” variable, the percentage of homeownership (Homeowner), does not have a 
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significant effect, but has been added because it appears to contribute to the validity 
conditions of the model (residual normality).  
The municipal debt outstanding (DebtOutstand) has a significant positive effect, 
implying that in-debt municipalities may also expect to obtain new tax revenue by taking in 
new residents, especially richer ones with a preference for large lots and who consequently 
require extensive developable areas.  
Left has a negative and significant effect, as in the Probit equation, and certainly for 
the same reasons. Disputes has a significant positive effect, as in the Tobit model. However, it 
is not clear whether disputes about land use policies are a cause or a consequence of the 
increased amount of developable land
vii
: increasing the amount of developable land can be 
either a source of disputes or a means of solving them.  
Surprisingly, Organic has a significant positive effect in the outcome equation, as in 
the Tobit model, which raises questions about how to account for the relationship between 
organic farming, land use policy and urban development, as well as for local agriculture’s 
image. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
Overall, the Two-Part model provides better insights into the determinants of the 
public decision and shows that these determinants differ at the two “stages” of the decision. 
Indeed, the Tobit model “ignores” the effect of some variables highlighted in the Two-Part 
model (PopNeighb, VacantH, Farmers, Turnover, fiscal variables, age variables as well as 
Azur and Left). However, the Tobit results confirm the effects observed in the Probit and/or 
the outcome equations for 6 variables (BuiltUp, Disputes, PopNeighb, VoteMargin, Income, 
Organic) and enable us to assess the effect of the amount of land still available 
(AvailableLand) in 1999.  
Finally in order to assess the contributions of our theoretical model and empirical 
validation methods, we apply an “as close as possible” SOVM model to the PACA Region 
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municipalities (see Appendix). Compared to this model, our model provides a higher number 
of significant variables and better explanatory power, improvements that can reasonably be 
attributed to the enrichment of the initial SOVM model and to the adaptations made so as to 
model the specific French situation. 
 
VI DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 An abundant theoretical and empirical literature exists on American land use policies 
but not on European ones, although historical, geographical and legal contexts suggest that 
processes should differ. In Europe, municipal land use regulations are an important tool to 
control farmland conversion to urban use. Hence, by identifying the determinants of French 
urban expansion policies as well as a set of empirical regularities, we believe our approach 
serves to validate the SOVM (2012) theoretical framework and adapt it to other contexts. 
Several of our findings on the median voter’s and dominant groups’ utility are 
revealing. First, three factors are revealed about the median voter. Income and UpperClass 
have negative effects on respectively the probability of increasing the developable area and on 
the extent of the increase. High-income and highly-educated households usually show a 
preference for preserving openland amenities, and are more likely to actively support slow 
growth (i.e. limited increases in developable area and low-density development) for the sake 
of amenities and sometimes for exclusionary reasons, in agreement with most of the North 
American work on this topic (see e.g. Fischel 1987; Richer 1995; Brueckner 1998; Brody 
2006; Nguyen 2009). Moreover, the respectively negative and positive effects of municipal 
Cashflow and debt outstanding (DebtOutstand) suggest that jurisdictions in a weak budgetary 
position are more likely to be pro-development. This positive effect of the municipal debt is 
also observed by SOVM (2012) for Spanish municipalities. However, another explanation for 
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this positive effect might be that a municipality engages in a high level of capital expenditure 
(water treatment plants, sports facilities, etc.) leading to debt in order to encourage 
development, and then changes the zoning/plan designation to actually get the development. 
Interestingly, BuildingTax, an equivalent to the US property tax, is never significant whatever 
the equation (Probit, outcome and Tobit).  
 
Second, Homeowner is not significant. However, this finding is not very contradictory 
to many other theoretical frameworks and observations, such as Fischel’s (2001) “Homevoter 
hypothesis” and Hilber and Robert-Nicoud’s (2006) model and empirical validationviii. 
Actually, while the absence of a significant effect may raise questions about the role of the 
“homeowner” outside the USA (suggesting that this role is less important in France because 
of differences in the local tax system and in public services financing, for instance), it could 
also suggest that homeowners care more about density than about the spatial extension of the 
urbanized area of their municipality. Thus, they may prefer low-density development that 
preserves their immediate environment and the social homogeneity of the municipal 
population; this preference may or may not involve urban extension, depending on the desired 
population growth. 
 
Third, determinants not usually considered - such as agriculture-related characteristics 
- have significant effects. Thus, the proportion of farmers appears to be a proxy for the 
proportion of landowners and for the weight of their interests. In contrast, when farms are 
more profitable than the median profitability of the sector, an increase in developable area is 
less likely, which confirms our hypothesis about the role of relative agricultural profitability 
and its use as a proxy for agricultural interest groups. However, this relative profitability only 
has a significant effect in the first step of the decision, which confirms what the field study 
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suggested: relative profitability is an important but not sufficient argument for farmland 
preservation. This is why it is important to also consider local agricultural organizations and 
agriculture’s image. However, the data available only allow us to assess the presence of 
organic farming in the municipality and the unexpected positive effect of Organic in the Tobit 
model and outcome equation raises questions about how to account for local agriculture’s 
image and the relationship between organic farming, land use policy and urban development. 
Indeed, our variable Organic is a dummy variable: given the absence of organic farming in 
most of the municipalities of our sample, it was not suitable to use a continuous variable (such 
as the percentage of organic holdings), although a continuous variable would have better 
accounted for the importance of organic farming in the municipality. Moreover, a good image 
of agriculture, namely good relationships between residents and farmers, is not exclusive to 
organic farming. This unexpected effect calls for a deeper analysis of relationships between 
organic farming adoption and urban expansion. For instance, is the adoption of organic 
farming a farmers’ strategy in municipalities that show an old and recurring tendency to 
increase their developable area, namely in municipalities in urban or close to urban areas, 
where demand for organic food can be higher? This is in agreement with some studies 
showing that a more likely reason why organic farming is located close to urban areas is to 
make relatively expensive land (because of urban pressure) more profitable while benefiting 
from urban demand for organic food (see e.g. Eades and Brown 2006; Frederiksen and Langer 
2004; Beauchesne and Bryant 1999; Stagl 2002; Christensen, Denver, and Krarup 2007; 
Allaire et al., 2013). A comparative analysis of dates of land use plan changes and conversion 
to organic farming, as well as a qualitative analysis of farmers’ strategies, could provide 
additional answers.  
Regarding “political” variables, we find that mayors with a comfortable majority 
(VoteMargin) find it easier to take restrictive planning decisionsix, in contrast with the SOVM 
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results, where the vote margin has a strongly significant positive effect on the increase in 
developable land. An interesting question, in fact, is why our findings here differ from the 
effects observed by SOVM: is it because of institutional context differences? Because of vote 
margin characterization methods? Left has also a negative effect, in accordance with the 
rationale proposed by Kahn (2011). He observes that Californian cities experiencing an 
increased proportion of liberal voters have a lower new housing permit growth rate and that 
this is correlated with a higher proportion of city hybrid vehicle registrations (the latter being 
used as a proxy for city residents’ environmentalism). The proportion of liberal voters also 
has a negative effect on the number of new housing permits in general and on the number of 
new housing permits for single-family housing. 
 
The municipality’s physical capacity to extend their developable area influences the 
extent of the increase in developable land: the more they have, the less parsimonious they are, 
as suggested by the positive effect of AvailableLand and the negative effect of being located 
on the Côte d’Azur, a very space-constrained area. Moreover, we suggest, like SOVM, that 
whatever the amount of physically available land, when the remaining vacant developable 
land is scarce, pro-development groups have more at stake and consequently there is greater 
lobbying. Our results are therefore slightly inconsistent with the hypothesis we (and SOVM) 
put forward concerning the effect of development opportunities, since the variable assessing 
the scarcity of remaining vacant developable land never has a significant effect.  
 
Both the fraction of municipal area urbanized (BuiltUp) and recent municipal 
population growth also have significant negative effects, in accordance with arguments 
related to optimal size (see e.g. Cooley and LaCivita 1982) and preservation of remaining 
natural/agricultural amenities (Schläpfer and Hanley 2003). Another interpretation of this 
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variable’s effect is given in Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2006), according to whom “land use 
constraints are the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed land – 
who have an interest in tight regulation – and owners of undeveloped land – who prefer 
flexible zoning laws and lax regulations [.So,] in general equilibrium, [they] show that a 
planning board – which maximizes aggregated land rents – will choose a high regulatory tax 
if the location is already highly developed (i.e., owners of developed land are relatively more 
influential) but will choose a low tax if the location is little developed (i.e., if owners of 
undeveloped land have a greater influence on planning decisions)”. 
 Regarding neighbouring effects, the positive effects of the population of the 
neighbouring municipalities found in the three equations can be explained by the fact that 
municipalities close to larger cities tend to meet the strong demand for housing they face by 
virtue of their proximity to an employment centre. Together with the effect of recent 
municipal population growth, this result suggests that urban development is shifted from 
municipalities that have experienced population growth to smaller and more peripheral areas 
that have experienced lower population growth in previous years. These results are in 
agreement with qualitative French analyses (Vilmin 2002; Castel 2007; Charmes 2007, 2009) 
and point to the need to qualify hypotheses commonly formulated in the North American 
literature. Indeed, the negative effect of Pop also confirms the findings of empirical studies 
such as those of Lewis and Neiman (2002), Protash and Baldassare (1983) or Donovan et al. 
(1994), while the positive effect of PopNeighb contradicts the assumption that the 
population pressure felt by a city will induce greater restrictiveness towards urban 
development (see e.g. Brueckner 1998; Nguyen 2009). 
Possible extensions could include taking fuller account - in both the theoretical 
framework and the empirical validation - of interactions between elected officials, interest 
groups and voters, or enriching the database, namely by taking into account density 
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restrictions and by using panel data to better fit the theoretical framework. Moreover, the role 
of agriculture’s image should be explored further since, while agriculture in the past did not 
always allow for soil protection, organic farming now appears to be an ally in environmental 
protection and in the preservation of agricultural areas with high profitability. The tendency of 
urban development to shift towards the peripheral municipalities as a consequence of 
municipal land use regulations is also a phenomenon that deserves attention. Finally, 
transposing this work to other geographical and legal contexts by relying on on-site interviews 
to calibrate the theoretical framework would be an interesting avenue of research. 
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Appendix: Transposing the Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal model to PACA Region.  
 The Solé-Ollé and Viladecans Marsal model explains the amount of land that became 
developable during the studied term of office (2003-2007) expressed as a percentage of the 
2003 built-up land area (ΔUrbanLand). Among the explanatory variables, VoteMargin is the 
incumbent’s margin of votes in 2007, VacantLand the amount of land assigned for 
development but still vacant in 2003 as a ratio of the 2003 built-up land area and OpenLand 
the amount of land neither built up nor assigned for development as a ratio of the 2003 built-
up land area. Dummy control variables include belonging to an urban area (vs. non-urban), 
belonging to a suburb, being on the coast, and whether the mayor belongs to a left-wing party 
(Left). A last set of variables measures demand increase, disamenity effects of growth, 
residents’ preferences and local demographic and employment shocks (% aged 25–40, % 
immigrants, % employed in manufacturing, and % employed in the top 5 industries in the 
region, % commuters, % homeowners, left-wing municipal government dummy, % graduates, 
% unemployed, population size and per capita income) as well as amenity and productivity 
factors (an “amenity index” and a measure of road accessibility). 
In their empirical application, SOVM find a significant and negative effect of 
VacantLand, a significant and positive effect of VoteMargin, OpenLand, belonging to an 
urban area, being part of the suburbs rather than of the core of the urban area and being on the 
coast. The positive effect of VoteMargin is even greater when the municipality is suburban or 
on the coast, has a high percentage of commuters or homeowners and has a left-wing mayor.  
We compare our theoretical framework with SOVM’s model, by estimating an “as 
close as possible” SOVM model on our data (detailed results upon request). We drop the % 
graduates from the model because of collinearity issues with Income.  
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No spatial dependence is found in the outcome nor in the Tobit equations. The 
percentage of urbanized land (BuiltUp) is used as an opposite proxy for Openland and has a 
negative and very significant effect (p-value < 10
-5
) in both the outcome and the Tobit 
equations, in accordance with SOVM (2012) and with the effect observed in our outcome 
equation. The only other significant effects in the outcome equation are for Left (p-value = 
0.06) and Homeowner (p-value =0.031). The effect of Left is negative, as in our model. The 
effect of Homeowner is positive, while it is not significant in our model. This positive effect 
suggests that suburban homeowners and residents care more about density (they would prefer 
low density development) than about the spatial extension of the urbanized area of their 
municipality. The only other significant effect in the Tobit model is for VoteMargin and is 
negative (p-value =0.032), as in our Tobit and Probit models. As left-wing parties won the 
first round of the legislative elections in only 31 municipalities, it is not possible to test 
whether in this subsample the effect of the VoteMargin is significant, as tested and found by 
SOVM.  
Compared to SOVM’s empirical model, our theoretical framework leads to a higher 
number of significant variables (10 vs. 3 in the outcome equation, 7 vs. 2 in the Tobit model), 
a higher adjusted R-squared (0.2859 vs. 0.1282) or pseudo R-squared (0.0344 vs. 0.0151) as 
well as lower Akaike and Bayesian criteria (AIC: 1003 vs. 1195 and BIC: 1056 vs. 1256). 
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Variable Definition Link with 
theor. frame. 
Mean Stand
. Dev. 
Min. Median Max. Missing 
AvailableLand Less than 35 % slope vacant land (no buildings, no infrastructure) not under strict 
(i.e. prohibiting any development) central government environmental or risk zoning 
as fraction of municipal area (%) 
p, du 76.87 20.12 3.65 84.43 98.86 24 
Azur Municipality is located on the Côte d’Azur( =1) v, p 0.24 0.18 0 0 1 24 
BuildingTax Municipal revenues from housing tax and built property tax as fraction of operating 
revenues in 2000 (%) 
f 27.12 8.28 0.72 27.62 55.51 0 
BuiltUp Municipal area urbanized in 1999 (%) du, e, f, 19.33 17.21 0.35 13.74 88.35 24 
CashFlow Municipal cash flow as fraction of operating revenues in 2000 (%) f 14.60 8.55 -24.60 14.03 47.08 0 
DebtOutstand Municipal debt outstanding as fraction of operating revenues in 2000 (%) f 84.48 45.61 0.00 79.40 319.05 0 
Farmers Difference in number of farmers between 2000 and 1990 as fraction of 1990 
population (%) 
da -0.75 1.11 -7.58 -0.50 3.97 16 
Pop Change in population between 1990 and 1999 (%) - 12.19 10.83 -23.46 11.02 52.46 24 
PopNeighb Kernel distance weighted mean of population change in bigger municipalities (%) v 4.40 3.68 -0.10 3.67 20.81 24 
Under14 Difference in number of under-14s between 1999 and 1990 as fraction of 1990 
population (%) 
f, r 1.54 5.20 -22.22 1.13 37.61 24 
Urbanland Area rendered developable from 1999 to 2006 as fraction of 1999 built-up area (%)  14.88 24.69 0.00 6.72 158.66 0 
VacantH Difference in number of vacant housing units between 1999 and 1990 as fraction of 
1990 housing units (%) 
r, du 0.09 5.54 -23.77 -0.13 67.31 24 
Disputes At least one dispute about land use plan changes between 2004 and 2007 (=1) p 0.19 0.15 0 0 1 24 
Farmers Fraction of farmers in the 2000 population (%) da,  du 2.48 2.59 0.00 1.56 12.91 24 
Homeowner Fraction of principal residence homeowner occupancy in 1999 (%) r, e, f 63.05 10.18 32.27 64.77 82.61 0 
Income Median annual income per unit of consumption in 2000 (€) r, e, f 14114 2456 66687 13712 22866 24 
Increase Municipality increased its developable area between 1999 and 2006 (=1) - 0.83 0.14 0 1 1 24 
Left Left-wing party (extreme left, left or green) received the highest number of votes in 
the municipality in 2002 legislative election (=1) 
p 0.12 0.11 0 0 1 24 
Organic At least one organic farmer in municipality (=1) da 0.29 0.21 0 0 1 24 
Over75 Fraction of population over 75 in 1999 (%) r 7.26 2.70 2.58 6.81 18.13 1 
PopNeighb Kernel distance weighted mean of population of bigger municipalities v 5685 5560 0 3727 31388 24 
Population Population in 1999 - 10702 51062 145 2847 797491 24 
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Turnover Municipality’s farm median turnover - farm median turnover among municipalities 
with the same main type of farming, as fraction of farm median turnover among 
municipalities with the same main type of farming in 2000 (%) 
da -29.81 76.81 -96.60 -51.68 522.70 24 
UpperClass Fraction of managers and professionals in 1999 (%) r, e, f 4.62 2.52 0.00 4.15 15.58 0 
VacantLand Less than 35 % slope vacant land not under strict central government environmental 
or risk zoning AND already zoned as developable in 1999, as fraction of 1999 
developable zone (%). 
p, du 61.42 15.41 0.00 63.08 91.95 0 
VoteMargin For municipalities over 3500 inhabitants: score in 2001 municipal election winning 
list * participation rate (%)
x
 
For municipalities under 3500 inhabitants: Sum of the votes received by the list that 
gathered the highest number votes in % of the total number of votes at the first 
round 2001 municipal election* participation rate (%) 
m 56.17 18.21 23.10 52.67 96.61 24 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models (n=327) 
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Variable Coef. P>|t| dy/dx P>|t| Mean 
AvailableLand 0.239** 0.023 .1138** 0.023 76.8731 
BuiltUp -0.341*** 0.003 -0.1623*** 0.002 19.3267 
Disputes (=1) 8.589** 0.038 4.337** 0.047 0.1914 
Under14 -0.635 0.117 -0.3021 0.117 1.5735 
Pop -0.217 0.361 -0.1031 0.361 12.2645 
PopNeighb 3.011*** <0.001 1.4320*** <0.001 4.4091 
VacantH -0.5312 0.206 -0.2528 0.204 0.0912 
Income -0.0017* 0.071 -0.0008* 0.067 14140.9 
Left (=1) -6.644 0.211 -2.9852 0.185 0.1221 
Organic(=1) 6.749* 0.059 3.3132* 0.063 0.2937 
PopNeighb 0.00012 0.664 0.00006 0.663 5703.51 
Population 6.60E-06 0.512 3.14E-06 0.510 10705.8 
VacantLand -0.1996 0.252 -0.0949 0.252 61.6977 
VoteMargin -0.411*** 0.001 -0.1953*** 0.001 56.0799 
Intercept 45.614*** 0.008 - - 1 
/sigma 24.830 <0.001 - - - 
Note. P-values: *** if < 0.01, ** if <0.05 and * if<0.1  
dy/dx: Average marginal effects over the sample (=1 for a discrete change of dummy variable from 
0 to 1) 
F(14, 289) = 3.91; Prob > F = 0.0000; Log pseudolikelihood = -1193.8011;  Pseudo R² = 0.0344 
Tests for spatial error autocorrelation:  
Moran I statistic standard deviate = -0.3313, p-value =0.7404 (Alternative = “Two sided”) with a 
population weighted kernel distance matrix (k=2, h=20km) 
Moran I statistic standard deviate = -1.0112, p-value = 0.3119 (Alternative = “Two sided”) with a 
weighted kernel distance matrix (k=2, h=20km) 
 
Table 2: Results of the Tobit equation (n= 303 observations, 53 left-censored at 
Urbanland<=0 and 250 uncensored) 
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Variable Coef. Rob. Std. Err. P>|t| dy/dx Std. Err. P>|t| 
Azur (=1) -1.17*** 0.25 0.0E
+00 
-0.26*** 0.07 0.00 
CashFlow -0.02* 0.01 0.08 -3.2E-3* 1.9E-3 0.09 
Under14 -0.09** 0.03 0.01 -0.013** 0.01 0.01 
Pop 0.01 0.01 0.31 2.0E-3 2.0E-03 0.31 
PopNeighb  0.11** 0.04 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01 
Farmers 0.16** 0.07 0.03 0.024** 0.01 0.02 
Income -1.6E-4*** 5.2E-05 2.0E-
03 
-2.4E-5** 1.0E-05 0.01 
Left (=1) -0.70** 0.28 .01 -0.15* 0.08 0.06 
Turnover -2.3E-3* 1.1E-03 0.05 -3.4E-4* 1.7E-4 0.05 
PopNeighb 7.1E-5** 2.7E-05 0.01 1.1E-5** 0.0E+00 0.01 
Population 2.0E-5 1.4E-05 0.16 2.9E-6 0.0E+00 0.12 
VoteMargin -0.02** 0.01 0.02 -2.6E-3** 1.2E-03 0.03 
Intercept 3.75*** 0.91 0.0E
+00 
  
 Note. P-values: *** if < 0.01, ** if <0.05 and * if<0.1 
dy/dx: Average marginal effects over the sample (=1 for a discrete change of dummy variable 
from 0 to 1) 
Log pseudolikelihood = -95.429421     Wald chi2(12)   =      65.15          Prob > chi2     =    < 
0.00001 
McFadden pseudo R²: 0.321                       Max_LL pseudo R²: 0.257 
Correct predictions: 86.14% 
Cragg & Uhler's pseudo R²: 0.426           AIC =216.859       BIC: 265,137 
Kelejian and Prucha (2001)’s Moran test for spatial error autocorrelation performed: 
- on the population weighted kernel distance matrix (k=2, h=20km): I²= 0.01048225, p-value= 
0.918 
- on the weighted kernel distance matrix (k=2, h=20km): I²= 0.008051674, p-value= 0.929 
Pinkse and Slade (1998)’s Lagrange Multiplier tests for spatial error autocorrelation performed 
on the (standardized) population weighted kernel dist. mat. (k=2, h=20km): LMPS=0.0151519 p-
val.= 0.902 
 
Table 3: Results of the Probit equation (n=303 observations)  
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Variable Coef. Rob. Std. 
err. 
Pr(>|t|) 
BuiltUp -4.21E-02*** 8.84E-03 3.40E-06 
DebtOutstand  7.35E-03*** 2.62E-03 5.46E-03 
Pop -2.46E-02* 1.28E-02 5.62E-02 
PopNeighb 9.00E-02* 4.67E-02 5.53E-02 
VacantH -7.02E-02*** 2.01E-02 5.66E-04 
Disputes 6.91E-01* 3.62E-01 5.73E-02 
Homeowner 1.72E-02 1.42E-02 2.25E-01 
Left -8.46E-01* 4.35E-01 5.29E-02 
Organic 7.69E-01*** 2.42E-01 1.66E-03 
Over75 -1.63E-01*** 5.48E-02 3.31E-03 
PopNeighb -4.24E-07 2.38E-05 9.86E-01 
Population -9.69E-08 1.02E-06 9.25E-01 
UpperClass -1.46E-01*** 5.46E-02 8.18E-03 
Intercept 3.23E+00*** 1.11E+00 3.97E-03 
Note. P-values: *** if < 0.01, ** if <0.05, * if<0.1 
Dependent variable = ((ΔUrbanland^0.17)-1)/0.17) 
LogLikelihood= -1238.243;Residual standard error: 1.771 on 234 
degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3235,Adjusted R-squared: 0.2859  
F-statistic: 8.608 on 13 and 234 DF, p-value: 2.944e-14 
Shapiro-Wilk normality of residuals: W = 0.9958, p-value = 0.7473 
Linearity test (power2:6): RESET = 0.6399, df1 = 5, df2 = 230, p-
value = 0.6695 
Moran I statistic standard deviate -0.4204, p-value = 0.6742 
(Alternative = “Two sided”) with a population weighted kernel 
distance matrix (k=2, h=20km) 
Moran I statistic standard deviate = -0.2582, p-value = 0.7962 
(Alternative = “Two sided” sided) with a kernel distance matrix (k=2, 
h=20km) 
 
Table 4: Results of the outcome equation (n=248 observations) 
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TITLES OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Population by municipality in study area (by quartile of number of 
inhabitants in 1999, INSEE). 
 
 
Figure 2: Municipalities where semi-directive interviews were conducted 
(C.V.S.D= Châteauneuf-Val-Saint-Donat)  
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                          
i
 Artificial land covers urban (continuous or discontinuous urban fabric), 
business and industrial areas, transportation infrastructures, mines, quarries, 
landfills, construction yards, green spaces (urban green spaces, sport and leisure 
facilities) as opposed to farmland, natural and forest areas, wetlands and water 
bodies (CORINE Land Cover nomenclature, CEC, 1995). 
ii
 We consider this choice to depend on one single elected representative, even 
though it is actually made through municipal council decisions and votes. 
iii
 Indeed, the self-selection problem is that if ui, the unobserved effect involved 
in the decision to make an increase is correlated to i, the individual 
heterogeneity of the model explaining the amount of the increase, then the  
estimators are not convergent since E[ΔUrbanlandi|Xi, i, Increasei=1]  
E[ΔUrbanlandi|Xi, i] = Xi + i. This possible correlation should be explicitly 
taken into account by assuming a joint distribution between the decision-to-
increase process and the decision on the amount of increase process (Chanel and 
M’Chirgui 2009): [ i,ui] ~ N2[(0,0),(
2
ε, ε, 1)] where 
2
ε is the variance of i ; 
is the covariance between i  and ui ;  is their linear correlation coefficient 
and 
2
u, the variance of  ui, is normalized to 1 to allow identification. 
iv
 In some municipalities, part of the land zoned as developable in 1999 became 
non- developable between 1999 and 2006, sometimes resulting in an actual net 
decrease in the developable area. However, we did not take such changes into 
account. Indeed for many of these municipalities, the urban fabric of the zones 
that became non-developable was actually diffuse, corresponding to the same 
diffuse urban fabric zones needing to be replaced and which were replaced by 
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non-developable zones. Other cases of developable land becoming non-
developable arose when the developable zones were oversized (generally in the 
70’s or 80’s); even in the 2000’s, it remains very unlikely that a landowner 
would apply to develop one of these parcels. Thus, making a developable zone 
non-developable again is almost never a political act in favor of urban growth 
containment, and while the qualitative approach allows us to identify exceptional 
cases, the quantitative approach does not. 
v
 Indeed, if the 1990’s value is 0, we cannot compute the evolution variable with 
the usual calculation of growth change. 
vi
 These variables are computed as follows. PopNeighbi = Population * W1 
where population is the vector of the variable “Population” and W1 is a row-
standardized distance matrix where diagonal elements are equal to zero and non-
diagonal elements are equal to exp(-(dij/h)
k
), with dij the distance between 
municipalities i and j, h=20km and k=2 if Populationj>Populationi, 0 otherwise. 
PopNeighbi = Pop*W2 where population is the vector of the variable “ Pop” 
and W2 is a row-standardized distance matrix where diagonal elements are equal 
to zero and non-diagonal elements are equal to Populationj * exp(-(dij/h)
k
) with 
dij the distance between municipalities i and j, h=20km and k=2 if 
Populationj>Populationi, 0 otherwise. 
vii
 Data for this variable are for the 2004-2007 period, while we are studying 
policy change between 1999 and 2006. 
viii
 Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2006) offer an explanation for a paradoxical 
observation: US metro area homeownership rates are strongly negatively related 
to regulatory restrictiveness. Their explanation is “articulated around the 
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heterogeneity of tenancy durations among the different classes of agents and 
[the fact] that small groups of agents with high stakes benefit most from 
collective action. [This implies that] while homeowners favor land use 
restrictions, the homeownership rate should have a negative impact on land use 
restrictions […] because a larger fraction of homeowners is matched with a 
smaller fraction of landlords (and tenants)]”. 
ix
 Our field study emphasizes the "support" role of central government 
institutions: in some "tight" situations (low local government legitimacy), some 
municipal councils use State constraints to justify unpopular decisions that 
preserve farmland.  
x
 If the winning list has been elected in the second round with more than 50% of 
votes, then its score is reduced to 50% before multiplying by the participation 
rate to show the stronger “legitimacy” of lists elected at the first round. 
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